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Abstract
We use Team Automata in order to model a protocol by Cachin et al. for securing agents in a
hostile environment. Our study focuses on privacy properties of the agents. We use the framework
to prove a result from the work by Cachin et al. As a by-product, our analysis gives some initial
insight on the limits of the protocol. From a diﬀerent perspective, this study continues a line of
research on the expressive power and modelling capabilities of Team Automata. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to use Team Automata for the analysis of privacy properties.
Keywords: Team automata, secure mobile agent, privacy, garbled circuits
1 Introduction
Agent technology is assuming a central role in various areas of computer sci-
ence. A prominent example are mobile agents, that are indeed a powerful
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mobile agents are software meant to run on foreign hosts, various security is-
sues arise in their respect. On the one side, hosts must be protected from non
trusted agents that might carry malicious code. This is the easy side of the
question, and is addressed with computer security techniques. In contrast, it
is much harder to protect a mobile agent from a hostile environment. While
an agent executes on a host, its code must be in the clear; if it needs to use
sensitive data that it carries along, often this data must be in the clear as well.
If it is stored in an encrypted form, it must be decrypted prior to use, and
therefore the appropriate decryption key must be available to the agent. This
suggests that usual cryptographic tools cannot protect an agent from being
robbed or spied upon.
But, although some vulnerabilities cannot be eliminated (the agent can
be killed or bogus data can be supplied to it), it would be very appealing to
provide data privacy and integrity mechanisms to mobile agents. Enhancing
them with security features can result in a very powerful and eﬀective way of
handling services on potentially hostile resources.
Because of the wide range of applications that can be imagined for a secure
agent, the issue is currently a hot topic in research. Recent approaches look for
a solution by carrying the idea of encryption to an unusual level; brieﬂy stated,
although the agent code itself remains in the clear, the function computed by
the agent is transformed so that the agent’s behaviour is incomprehensible
to an observer that doesn’t have a key for interpretation. The ﬁrst proposal
in this direction is due to Sander and Tschudin [15]. Their technique has
been generalized by Cachin et al. [9] who use the idea of garbled circuits by
Yao [16]. It must be noted that these approaches are still pioneer solutions
to the security problem posed above, in that the security goals achieved are
still very restrictive and the agent model to which they apply is somewhat
awkward.
As a ﬁrst step towards a comprehension of the potentialities of these meth-
ods, and of intrinsic limitations of software agents from the point of view of
security, we formalize the protocol of Cachin et al. [9] using Team Automata
(TA), [2].
TA are inspired by—and form an extension of—Input/Output automata
(IOA) [13]. TA form a ﬂexible framework for modelling communication be-
tween system components. A TA is composed of component automata (CA),
which are ordinary automata without ﬁnal states and with a distinction of
their sets of actions into input, output and internal actions. TA model the
logical architecture of a system by describing it solely in terms of an automa-
ton, the role of actions, and synchronizations between these actions. The crux
of composing a TA is to deﬁne the way in which its constituting CA commu-
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nicate by synchronizations. In particular, given a set of CA, there is no such
thing as the unique TA composed over that set of CA. Rather, a whole range
of TA, distinguishable only by their synchronizations, can be composed over
this set of CA.
The rigorous setup of the TA framework allows one to formulate and verify
general and speciﬁc logical properties of complex (distributed, reactive) sys-
tems in a mathematically precise way. In realistically large computer systems,
security is a big issue, and these frameworks allow formal proofs of correctness
of its design. Moreover, such a formal approach forces one to unambiguously
describe one’s design and it may suggest new aspects not seen otherwise.
In particular, TA have been proved to cover the speciﬁcation of several
access control strategies of [3]. Also, the ongoing work on developing a TA
framework for the analysis of security properties—which was initiated in [5]
and further developed in [6]. In [7], a survey is presented of the use of TA
in the ﬁeld of security. We continue this line of research, by exploiting their
ﬂexibility and intuitive modelling of a multi-host environment.
The protocol of Cachin et al. [9] is based on the idea of entrusting data to
an agent in the form of a circuit that evaluates to a single output. The circuit
is obtained as a cascade of components each one constructed by one of the
hosts visited by the agent. In [9], it is proven that the protocol preserves the
privacy of all actors’ inputs.
We contribute a TA based analysis of this privacy property. To the best
of our knowledge, TA have not been used before in the study of privacy.
Our analysis also has the merit of providing a high level model of the actors’
behaviour and interaction, abstracting away from cryptographic details, giving
a clearer insight of the protocol. Our model, interestingly, naturally represents
the agent as a set of actions as opposed to an entity per se. This suggests that
the protocol does not respect the object oriented spirit of agents. On the other
hand, taking the perspective of the agent’s source, it models the source’s view
of the system according to the intuition that the source delegates tasks fully
to the agent.
In the following section we give a high level description of the protocol and
recall the relevant results about garbled circuits and the protocol itself. In
Section 3 we overview the basic facts about TA. Section 4 is devoted to the
model and to the formal analysis of privacy features. We conclude with some
remarks.
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2 The protocol
The soundness and privacy properties of the protocol of [9] follow from math-
ematical results based on standard cryptographic assumptions. We abstract
away from the details and are interested in the behaviour of the actors (the
agent, the agent’s source and the hosts that are visited by the agent) at a
higher level. Our description of the protocol focuses on the interactions be-
tween the actors. We give as much insight on the cryptographic bases on
which the protocol relies, as is suﬃcient for our arguments. We refer to [9] for
a detailed description.
We conﬁne ourselves to the simpler case of the “honest but curious model,”
in which actors are supposed to follow the protocol correctly, but they might
try to learn the private inputs of the other parties. Furthermore, for a realistic
model, as usual, we assume that all actors are polinomially bounded. (To avoid
clumsiness, we do not restate this assumption in all lemmas and deﬁnitions.)
The goal of the design is a secure agent that travels through many hosts
collecting sensitive information and then back to its source; back home, it
will be able to deliver the result of a computation on inputs collected at the
various hosts together with the source’s input. The security feature that the
protocol aims at is privacy of all the inputs, that is no party learns the inputs
of any other party.
The idea is to combine in a cascade Yao style garbled circuits [16]. The
software agent travels from host to host collecting private information in the
form of a (portion of) garbled circuit. The circuit (potentially software) is
actually data, since it can only be evaluated to a single value once it has been
brought back to the agent’s source.
2.1 Garbled circuits
A garbled circuit (see [14,16]) is a generalization of a circuit, with the following
properties:
• each wire can carry one of two speciﬁed random strings (not just bits 0/1),
the random strings changing from wire to wire (the pair of strings on each
wire have semantical interpretation 0 and 1);
• for each gate a speciﬁc computational rule is given, that deﬁnes how the
random strings in input are to be combined to produce the output, which is
again a random string (the semantical interpretation of a gate is a NAND
or a XOR, for instance).
The garbled inputs are the random strings of each input wire whose seman-
tical value is the value of the corresponding input bit. The decoding of the
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output is a translation of the random strings on the output wires to their se-
mantical meanings. The garbled circuit is a description of the structure of the
circuit together with computational rules for each node but no information
on the random strings carried by each wire.
The following holds (see [14]):
Lemma 2.1 (Indistinguishability) For any two actors C and D knowing
the garbled circuit, if C only knows the garbled version of D’s input (and not
the other random strings carried by D’s input wires) garbled circuit evaluation
will not disclose more information than if C ran the protocol assuming any
random input for D.
2.2 The Wannabe Traveller
For a lighter exposition, and without loss of generality, we present the protocol
in the speciﬁc setting of an actor W (the Wannabe Traveller) who dispatches
an agent in quest of the best oﬀer for a holiday on a tropical island. This
example is inherited from the master thesis in [10].
The agent visits travel agencies Agj, chosen according to some policy that
we do not specify here. At each agency, it browses the catalogue and requests
the best oﬀer for a holiday matching conditions on the destination, the period,
the services, etc., that W requires.
We assume that travel agencies want the privilege of tailoring their oﬀers
to the speciﬁc client, and therefore prefer that the oﬀer be known only if it is
highly likely to be accepted. Moreover each agency does not want that its oﬀer
be known to competitors. On the other hand, W does not want to disclose
in advance her budget, to avoid that travel agents use it as an information
to adjust their oﬀer. Assuming correctness, this leads us to the following
deﬁnition of the privacy goals we aim at (see [9], pag. 10):
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Privacy) W’s agent respects privacy if
(i) W cannot determine any other oﬀer but the lowest one less than or equal
to her budget, if it exists;
(ii) each agency cannot learn W’s budget, nor the oﬀer of any other agency.
2.3 The Wannabe-Traveller Protocol
Our analysis is focused on the privacy aspects. Therefore we only consider the
agent’s functionality related to privately (in the sense deﬁned above) conveying
to W the best oﬀer. Also, we will not model the agent itself as a separate
entity. Rather, the agent is represented by a sequence of actions which it
repeats identically at each host visited: the collection of sensitive data.
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For simplicity, we ﬁrst consider the case of an agent that visits a single
host. W is the source of the agent, and Ag is the host that the agent visits.
In our setting, Ag constructs a garbled circuit that on input 〈id0, x〉, 〈id1, y〉,
outputs 〈id0, x〉, if x ≤ y, and 〈id1, y〉 otherwise. We call tagged minimum the
function computed by the circuit. (The description and analysis that follow
are absolutely independent of the speciﬁc function computed by the garbled
circuit.)
Let idW (resp. idAg) be W’s (resp. Ag’s) identiﬁers. Further, let inputW
(resp. inputAg) be W’s (resp. Ag’s) private input.
In order to evaluate the circuit on 〈idW , inputW 〉 and 〈idAg, inputAg〉, W
must learn the garbled circuit, the decoding information of the output and the
values of her and Ag’s garbled inputs. Ag must not learnW’s input. In order to
transfer to W the garbled inputs corresponding to W’s input 〈idW , inputW 〉,
without Ag’s learning the value of the input itself, the two parties use an
oblivious transfer (OT) protocol [8]. (Also see [9] for the implementation of a
one-round oblivious transfer; we assume that W and Ag share a pseudorandom
generator and a seed.)
Let β be W’s committal data for OT, referred to 〈idW , inputW 〉. Let
GC = gc(〈idAg, inputAg〉, OT (β)) be the garbled circuit computed by Ag,
with Ag’s input hardwired into it, and information OT (β) attached to it, for
obliviously transferring to W her garbled input. We denote by decode the
decoding information for the output.
Then the protocol is as follows:
W−→Ag : β
Ag−→W : 〈GC, decode〉
W computes the single value tagged min(〈idAg, inputAg〉, 〈idW , inputW 〉).
Assuming correctness, the protocol guarantees privacy in the sense of Def-
inition 2.2 (see [9] for a proof):
Lemma 2.3 (Privacy–two parties) In the honest but curious model, as-
suming correctness of the protocol, the two party protocol above guarantees
privacy in the sense of Deﬁnition 2.2.
In the general case, the agent visits many hosts. We assume, without loss
of generality, that the agent travels from W to Ag1 to Ag2 and so on, and then
back from Agn to W .
We generalize and complete the notation that we used for the two-party
case. Let inputW be the private input of W, and inputj be the private input
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of Agj. As above, let β be W’s commitment to 〈idW , inputW 〉.
Ag1 computes a garbled circuit GC1 = gc(〈id1, input1〉, OT (β)) as in the
two-party protocol above. It then forwards 〈GC1, decode1〉 to Ag2. (The OT
data for Alice attached to GC1 will be forwarded to Alice along with the
garbled circuit.)
All other agencies will compute garbled circuits for the tagged minimum
function and combine it in cascade one after the other.
For j > 1, let gcj = gc(〈idj, inputj〉, transl(decodej−1)) be the garbled
circuit computed by Agj , with input 〈idj, inputj〉 hardwired to it, and trans-
lation information transl(decodej−1) for translating the garbled output of the
cascade of circuits GCj−1 computed by agencies Ag1 through Agj−1 to a gar-
bled input for gcj. Then, GCj is gcj concatenated to GCj−1. Let decodej be
the instructions for decoding its output.
Agj forwards to Agj+1 〈GCj, decodej〉.
W receives the output of AGn as if she were an AGn+1, and evaluates it.
The protocol is summarized below (W−→∗ describes W’s output of the
ﬁnal value).
W−→Ag1 : β
Agj−→Agj+1 : 〈GCj, decodej〉 j=1,. . .,n− 1
Agn−→W : 〈GCn, decoden〉
W−→∗ : eval(GCn, decoden, β)
Lemma 2.4 (Cascade of garbled circuits) For all j = 1, . . . , n,
(i) a polynomially bounded actor cannot infer the private inputs of W and
Ag1, . . . , Agj from the garbled circuit 〈GCj, decodej〉;
(ii) moreover, with knowledge of W’s (garbled) input, a polynomially bounded
actor cannot infer the private inputs of Ag1, . . . , Agj.
Proof. [Sketch] For j = 1, the thesis follows from Lemma 2.3. For j > 1, it
can be proven inductively, based on Lemma 2.1. 
We use TA to prove the following privacy property:
Theorem 2.5 (Privacy—many parties) In the honest but curious model,
assuming correctness of the protocol, the multi-party protocol above guarantees
privacy in the sense of Deﬁnition 2.2.
The proof of the theorem is given in the sequel as it follows from our TA
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analysis. A proof (not involving TA) is informally outlined in the last four
lines of [9]. Furthermore, our Lemma 2.4 formalizes an intermediate step of
the same arguments from [9].
3 Team Automata
In this section, we describe the main characteristic of TA. In particular, we
introduce some technical details that will be useful throughout the paper. For
more information on TA the reader is referred to [1,2,11]. Further, we assume
some familiarity with automata theory.
A TA T consists of component automata (CA)—ordinary automata with-
out ﬁnal states and with a distinction of their sets of actions into input, output,
and internal actions—combined in a coordinated way such that they can per-
form shared actions. Internal actions have strictly local visibility and cannot
be used for communication with other CA, while input and output actions
together form the external actions that are observable by other CA and that
are used for communication between CA. Thus, when composing TA over a
set of CA, the internal actions of the CA in the set must be private. In par-
ticular, each action that is output (resp. internal) for one or more of the CA
constituting a TA becomes an output (resp. internal) action of the TA. The
input actions of the CA that do not occur at all as output actions of any of





denote the pairwise disjoint sets of input, output and internal actions of T .




out denotes the set of external actions of T . Finally,
ΣTcom denotes the set of output actions of T involved in actual communications
between CA in a TA.
During each clock tick, the CA within a TA can simultaneously participate
in one instantaneous action, i.e., synchronize on this action, or remain idle.
CA can thus be combined in a loose or more tight fashion depending on which
actions are to be synchronized, and when. For each external action separately,
a decision is made as to how and when the components should synchronize on
this action. Each choice of synchronizations thus deﬁnes a TA. Every TA is
again a CA, which, in turn, can be used in an iteratively composed TA.
Sometimes it can be useful to internalize certain external actions of a TA
before using this TA as a building block, in order to prohibit the use of these
actions on a higher level of the construction. To this aim, we introduce here
the hide operator: hideΓ(T ) is the TA in which the subset Γ of external actions
of the TA T have become unobservable for other TA, having been turned into
internal actions.
It may sometimes be useful to construct unique TA of a speciﬁed type.
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In [4] several ﬁxed strategies for choosing the synchronizations of a TA were
deﬁned, each leading to a uniquely deﬁned TA. From those, we use here a
maximality principle that will be used in the rest of the paper. Informally,
the so called max-ai TA is the TA in which the synchronization is deﬁned on
all and only those transitions in which, for each action, all CA featuring that
action participate to the transition. The max-ai TA over a set {T1 , . . . , Tn} of
CA is denoted as ||| {T1 , . . . , Tn}.
Let Σ and Γ be two sets of symbols. Then, the morphism presΣ,Γ : Σ → Γ
∗,
deﬁned by presΣ,Γ(a) = a if a ∈ Γ and presΣ,Γ(a) = λ otherwise, preserves the
symbols from Γ and erases all other symbols. We discard Σ when no confusion
can arise.
Let T be a TA over a set of CA. Then, the Γ-behaviour of T , denoted as
BΓ
T
, is deﬁned as usual in automata theory, BΓ
T
= presΓ(CT ), with set CT of
computations of T consisting of all the sequences α = q0a1q1 . . . anqn, where
n ≥ 0 and q0 is an initial state, qi, are states, ai are actions and (qi−1, ai, qi)
are transitions.
Along with this general notion of behaviour, other notions can be deﬁned.
When Γ = ΣTout, then B
Σout
T
is the output behaviour of T . By opportunely
choosing Γ, also the input and the internal behaviour of T can be deﬁned.
4 The Wannabe-Traveller Protocol Modelled by TA
We now show how TA can be used to model the Wannabe Traveller protocol.
We model the Wannabe Traveller W by a CA TW , the set {Agj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}
of travel agencies by CA TAg1 , . . . , TAgn .
Let Input denote the set of pairs {〈idj, inputj〉 | 1 ≤ j ≤ n} ∪ {〈idW ,
inputW 〉} where inputj (resp. inputW ) is a string that is private to Agj (resp.
to W).
Let Computed denote the set of garbled circuits.
Let β be W’s OT commitment data. Let Decode denote the set {decodej |
1 ≤ j ≤ n} ∪ {β} where decodej (j = 1, . . . , n) is the decoding information
for the output of circuit GCj.
Then TAgj uses the function gc : Input× Decode → Computed to com-
pute the garbled circuit gcj and the function || : Computed× Computed →
Computed to build up the circuit GCj consisting of the cascade of garbled
circuits gc1 through gcj.
Let Result = Input. Then, TW evaluates the ﬁnal result using the function
eval : Computed× Decode× Input → Result.
For each j = 1, . . . , n, deﬁne Pj = 〈GCj, decodej〉 and P0 = β. Then,
Messages denotes the set {Pj | 0 ≤ j ≤ n} ∪ Result.
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We specify TA in the way IOA are commonly deﬁned [12,13]. The states
of a TA are thus deﬁned by the current values of the variables listed under
States, while its transitions are deﬁned, per action a, as preconditions (Pre)
and eﬀect (Eﬀ), i.e., (q, a, q′) is a transition of a TA if the precondition of a
is satisﬁed by q, while q′ is the transformation of q deﬁned by the eﬀect of a.
In all the speciﬁcations, we explicitly prohibit loops, i.e., we allow each
action to be performed only once. See, for example, the speciﬁcation of TAg1 .
As soon as TAg1 has received P0, then precondition P0 /∈ received prevents this
action to be executed again.






received, sent ⊆ Messages, computed ⊆ Computed, all initially ∅
Transitions
Pj−1
Pre: Pj−1 /∈ received
Eﬀ: received := received ∪ {Pj−1}
Computej
Pre: Pj−1 ∈ received ∧GCj /∈ computed
Eﬀ: computed := computed ∪ {GCj}
Pj
Pre: GCj ∈ computed ∧ Pj /∈ sent
Eﬀ: sent := sent ∪ {Pj}
The input behaviour B
Σinp
TAgj
of TAgj (j = 1, . . . , n) consists of Pj−1. When
TAgj receives message Pj−1, then TAgj is able to perform an internal computa-
tion leading to an internal behaviour BΣint
TAgj
consisting of Computej . Finally,
the output behaviour BΣout
TAgj
of TAgj , (j = 1, . . . , n) consists of Pj.
We continue with the speciﬁcation of TW . It is capable to output a com-
mitment β to inputW . Then, it is capable of receiving as input behaviour the
last circuit and the last decoding instructions to evaluate the ﬁnal result min
by starting from what she has received and from inputW , by means of function
eval. Finally, TW outputs the ﬁnal result min.
TW — Wannabe Traveller
Actions
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Inp: {Pn}
Out: {P0} ∪ {min}
Int: {EvalGCn}
States
received, sent ⊆ Messages, result ⊆ Result, all initially ∅
Transitions
Pn
Pre: Pn /∈ received
Eﬀ: received := received ∪ {Pn}
P0
Pre: P0 /∈ sent
Eﬀ: sent := sent ∪ {P0}
EvalGCn
Pre: Pn ∈ received ∧min /∈ result
Eﬀ: result := result ∪ {min}
min
Pre: min ∈ result ∧min /∈ sent
Eﬀ: sent := sent ∪ {min}
The input behaviour B
Σinp
TW
of TW is clearly represented by Pn. When TW
receives message Pn, then TW is able to perform an internal computation lead-
ing to an internal behaviour BΣint
TW




Now, we enforce maximal synchronization between the traveller and the
agencies. Thus, the max-ai TA over {TW , TAgj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}, denoted by TWT ,
is deﬁned as
TWT = ||| {TW , TAgj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n},
which formalizes the Wannabe Traveller protocol. From the way CA are com-
posed, the resulting team has no input actions, while it has the union of the
output (internal) actions of TW and the TAgj ’s as its output (internal) actions.
4.1 Privacy
In this section, we show, through the use of TA, that W’s agent respects
privacy, in the sense of Deﬁnition 2.2, in the multiparty case (n > 1).
We abstract away from the syntax details concerning the operations ac-
cording to which messages can be manipulated, but we assume the presence
of an inference system (deﬁned by a derivation operator 	) that implements
these operations. By applying operations from this system to a set M of
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messages, a new set D(M) = {m | M 	 m} of messages (usually called the
deduction set) can be obtained.
We restrict the initial knowledge of an automaton A to be bound to a
speciﬁed set of messages φA. This informally means that the automaton should
be able to produce, by means of only its internal functioning, at most the
messages contained in D(φA). More speciﬁcally, when considered as a stand-
alone component, the automaton can only execute output actions belonging
to D(φA).
The initial knowledge can be increased to the set φ′A during the execution
of the protocol by the messages the automaton receives. Accordingly, the
automaton knowledge becomes at most D(φ′A).
We use this notion of knowledge to model privacy. Since we use TA in
order to model poliniomially bounded actors, we require that their inference
power be polinomially bounded as well.
Throughout the analysis, we abstract away from the internal computa-
tions of the single automata. This is justiﬁed by the following: since we are
interested in privacy properties, we care about the information ﬂow between
the principals, rather than about their internal computations. Thus, in the
following we restrict our survey to analyze external actions of our system.
First, we show that W cannot determine any other oﬀer but the lowest one
less than or equal to her budget, if it exists (Deﬁnition 2.2(i)).
We must analyze how the knowledge of W is altered in the course of proto-
col execution. We want to highlight the interactions of W with the rest of the
system. Therefore, since we choose to take W’s standpoint, communications
between agencies, and any distinction among them, are of no interest. So, we
combine agencies into a unique block that interacts with W in a way that is
indistinguishable from the original system.
We obtain this by deﬁning TW as the max-ai TA over {TAgj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}





i.e., all messages that the travel agencies exchange with each other:
TW = hideΣcom( ||| {TAg1 , . . . , TAgn})
Thus, TW appears as a black box, with some input and output actions it
will use to interact with the environment. In our setting W plays the role of
the environment. Intuitively, this reﬂects the nature of the protocol itself: W
delegates to its agent the choice of the agencies to visit, and does not need to
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Proof. The equality follows from the construction of TW . 
We can now use Proposition 4.1 to prove the part of Theorem 2.5 relative
to Deﬁnition 2.2(i):
Proof of Theorem 2.5 (part 1):
By construction, the initial knowledge of TW is bound to φW = {β, inputW ,
idW}. By deﬁnition of the automaton knowledge, the only way in which TW
can signiﬁcantly increase its knowledge is by performing input actions. To















From the way TAgn is composed, it follows that Σ
TAgn
out = {〈GCn, decoden〉}.
From Section 4, it follows that 〈GCn, decoden〉 will be executed, and it will be
executed only once. Thus, BΣout
TAgn
= 〈GCn, decoden〉.
The latter, Proposition 4.1 and Equation (1) imply that the knowledge
of TW becomes at most D(φ
′
W ), with φ
′
W = {β, inputW , idW , 〈GCn, decoden〉}.
Then, by Lemma 2.4, we conclude that the privacy property of Deﬁnition 2.2(i)
holds, since we are assuming correctness and TW has polinomially-bounded
inference power. (Recall that the correctness assuption means that GCn is
exactly the garbled circuit computing the (tagged) minimum among all of the
private inputs.) 
The proof of the second privacy property (Deﬁnition 2.2(ii)) is very similar.
This time we take the standpoint of Agj, for any ﬁxed j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Again we view the rest of the system as a unique block that interacts with
Agj in a way that is undistinguishable from the way that the collection of the
single actors interact with it. To this end we build the following TA:
TAgj = hideC( ||| {TW , TAg1 , . . . , TAgj−1 , TAgj+1 , . . . , TAgn})


























, if j = 1.
Proof. The equalities follow from the construction of TAgj . 
We can now complete the proof of Theorem 2.5:
Proof of Theorem 2.5 (part 2):
By construction, the initial knowledge of TAgj is bound to φAgj = {inputj, idj}.
By deﬁnition of the automaton knowledge, the only way in which TAgj can sig-
niﬁcantly increase its knowledge is by performing input actions. To correctly













, if j = 1.








From the way TAgj−1 is composed, Σ
TAgj−1
out = {〈GCj−1, decodej−1〉}. From
Section 4, it follows that 〈GCj−1, decodej−1〉 will be executed, and it will
be executed only once. Thus, BΣout
TAgj−1
= 〈GCj−1, decodej−1〉. From similar
arguments, it follows that BΣout
TW
= β.
The latter, Proposition 4.2 and Equation (2) imply that the knowledge of







{inputAgj , idj, 〈GCj−1, decodej−1〉} if j > 1
{inputAgj , idj, β} if j = 1.
Then, by Lemma 2.4 (if j > 1) or Lemma 2.3 (if j = 1), we conclude that the
privacy property of Deﬁnition 2.2(ii) holds, since we are assuming correctness
and all the automata have polynomially-bounded inference power.
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This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.5. 
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We propose a way of modelling the secure agents of [9], in the framework of
Team Automata. We investigate a possible way of analyzing privacy properties
with TA. To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst attempt to use TA in
order to analyze privacy properties.
We are indebted to a referee for stressing a point which we left implicit
in the ﬁrst version of the paper. The referee remarks that the results seem
“obviously” true, appreciatively emphasizing the simplicity of the proofs we
give. This simplicity depends on the fact that TA abstract away from the
cryptographic layer and focus on pure communication aspects. On the other
hand, the privacy properties of the protocol we analyze depend mostly on
the cryptographic aspects of the construction. We argue that simplicity is a
desirable property in the setting of security protocols veriﬁcation. In our case,
we owe it to the fact that we use a communication-based model, that allows
us to distinguish which are the sensitive ingredients of a protocol.
This research is a preliminary step towards the understanding and possibly
generalization of techniques for securing mobile autonomous agents. In our
analysis we target a speciﬁc privacy property, which is the core of the proposal
of [9], but we aim at a broader study of the potentials of such an approach.
The insight we gain underlines a weakness of this approach to secure agents.
Indeed, it emerges in a natural way, that the protocol we study is not agent
oriented in spirit, but it rather oﬀers a means of adding a security layer over
agent technologies. Our impression is that such an approach cannot carry
very far. In related ongoing research, we are exposing the computational cost
of this methodology.
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Notation
For convenience of the reader, we summarize the notation that we used to
describe the protocol.
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t1 if x1 = min(x1, x2)
t2 otherwise;
• inputW is the private input of W;
• inputAg is the private input of Ag in the two-party protocol;
• inputj is the private input of Agj in the multi-party protocol;
• β is W’s committal data for OT, referred to 〈idW , inputW 〉.
• GC = gc(〈idAg, inputAg〉, OT (β)) is the garbled circuit computed by Ag,
with Ag’s input hardwired into it, and information OT (β) attached to it,
for obliviously transferring to W her garbled input, in the two-party case;
• decode is the decoding information for the output of GC;
• GC1 = gc(〈id1, input1〉, OT (β)) is the garbled circuit analogous to GC
above, computed by AG1 in the multi-party protocol;
• decodej is the decoding information for the output of garbled circuit GCj;
• for j > 1, gcj = gc(〈idj, inputj〉, transl(decodej−1)) is the garbled circuit
computed by Agj , with input 〈idj , inputj〉 hardwired to it, and translation
information transl(decodej−1) for translating the garbled output of the cas-
cade of circuits computed by agencies Ag1 through Agj−1 to a garbled input
for gcj;
• GCj is gcj concatenated to GCj−1;
• eval(GCn, decoden, β) denotes evaluation of circuit GCn with decoding in-
formation decoden to interpret the output and additional input β to com-
plete the OT.
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